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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the fact that a divorce court awards a wife 
property and alimony from her husband to provide for her past and 
future expenses when she has been injured by her husband should 
bar the wife's separate personal injury action against him for 
general, special and punitive damages. 
2. Whether a divorce court's unchallenged and unappealed 
factual finding that a husband intentionally shot his wife in the 
head with a .22 calibre rifle should collaterally estop the same 
issue from being relitigated in the wife's subsequent personal 
injury action against her former husband. 
3. Whether the doctrine of interspousal immunity can be 
used to prevent a woman from suing her former husband for 
negligently shooting her in the head with a .22 calibre rifle. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
1. The Addendum contains copies of the following: 
a. Divorce Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, D.R. at 138-151. 
b. Decision of Judge Ballif in the court below, on 
doctrine of interspousal immunity, P.I.R. at 127-129. 
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c. Judge Rallif's Order dismissing Mrs. Noble's causes 
of action for battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, P.I.R. at 197-198. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sometime durina the night of Auqust 18, 19R0, V. Glen 
Noble shot his wife, Elaine Hansen Noble, in the head at close 
range with a .22 calibre rifle. D.R. at 140. (In this brief, 
references to the record on appeal in the personal injury case, 
Appeal No. 20401, will be identified as "P.I.R."; the record on 
appeal in the divorce, Appeal 19934, will be identified as 
"D.R.") 
Although seriously and permanently injured, Mrs. Noble 
survived the gun shot wound. 
After Glen Noble shot his wife, he commenced a divorce 
action against her, alleginq that she had treated him cruelly, 
and caused him great mental distress and suffering. D.R. at S. 
Mrs. Noble counterclaimed for divorce on the grounds that he had 
treated her cruelly and abused her both physically and mentally. 
D.R. at 10. 
After hearing all the evidence, the trial court dismissed 
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Mr. Noble's claim for divorce, but granted Mrs. Noble's 
counterclaim. D.R. at 150. The court specifically found as 
follows: 
"... fMr. Noble! intentionally and willfully and without 
just cause, shot the defendant Elaine Hansen Noble, in the 
head with a .2? calibre rifle, thereby causing severe bodily 
injury to the defendant." 
D.R. at 140. 
As a result of this senseless and tragic shooting, 
Mrs. Noble has been made to suffer greatly and lose in large 
measure the happiness and satisfaction she might have expected 
from her life. She is totally and permanently disabled, 
unemployable and unable to live alone or use a motor vehicle 
safely. D.R. at 140. 
In order to provide for Mrs. Noble's needs, the divorce 
court awarded her property valued approximately 5264,000.00 
from assets valued at over $300,000. D.R. at 141-144. The 
court considered not only Mrs. Noble's needs, but also 
Mr. Noble's age, future income, needs and abilities. Id. 
The court specifically found that during the pendency of the 
divorce, Mr. Noble received in excess of $569,000.00 in cash from 
the sale of various assets. D.R. at 148-149. 
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After finding that Mrs. Noble's future income would be 
only $307.00 per month from social security disability benefits, 
while Mr. Noble's monthly income would exceed $2,000.00, the 
court awarded $750.00 per month as alimony. D.R. at 340-141. 
Mr. Noble has appealed from the divorce decree, urging 
that the court abused its discretion in its property division and 
alimony. See Appellant's Docketing Statement, in Appeal 
No. 19934. Significantly, Mr. Noble has not contested the 
court's finding that he intentionally shot his wife. Id_; see 
also Appellant's Brief, in Appeal No. 19934. 
During the pendency of the divorce action, Mrs. Noble 
filed a separate leqal action against Mr. Noble for her personal 
injuries, alleging negligence, battery and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. P.I.R. at 88. This personal injury 
action was never consolidated with the divorce and the divorce 
court specifically stated that it did not consider the personal 
injury action in dividinq property and awarding alimony. D.R. at 
149. 
On April 19, 1983, before the divorce trial took place, the 
court in the personal injury action granted partial summary 
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judgment to Mr. Noble, holding that Mrs. Noble's cause of action 
for negligence was barred by the doctrine of interspousal 
immunity. P.I.R. at 132. Mrs. Noble filed a notice of intent 
to appeal on May 20, 1983. P.I.R. at 135. 
The divorce trial took place before Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
on December 22-23, 1983. D.R. at 107-115. Judge Tibbs entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on 
April 13, 1984. D.R. at 150, 158. Subsequently, on December 14, 
1984, the Honorable George E. Ballif, judge in the personal 
injury action, dismissed the remaining counts of Mrs. Noble's 
personal injury complaint, for battery and for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. P.I.R. at 197-198. In so 
doing, the Court, through Judge Ballif, held that the personal 
injury claims had been effectively litigated and determined in 
the divorce action, and were, therefore, barred by "res 
judicata." P.I.R. at 197-198. Mrs. Noble timely filed a Notice 
of Appeal from this dismissal. P.I.R. at 199. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There are three reasons, each sufficient, for reversinq 
dismissal of Mrs. Noble's intentional tort action. 
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First, a divorce action is not res judicata to a subsequent 
personal injury action based on the same facts. Res judicata 
cannot be used where the two causes of action are not identical. 
Divorce and personal injury are different causes of action 
because they seek to remedy different harms and they involve 
different issues and elements. 
Second, the record before the district court was inadequate 
to support res judicata. Neither the divorce decree itself, nor 
the findings of fact, nor any part of the record in the divorce 
court were properly before the court below. A finding of res 
judicata must rest upon proper evidence of the proceedings in the 
case relied upon as a bar. 
Third, Mr. Noble was appealing the divorce decree at the 
same time as he was urging it as a bar to the personal injury 
case. Judgments on appeal lack the finality necessary for res 
judicata effect. Reversal of the judgment may undo the 
"adjudication" relied upon as res judicata. For that reason, 
judgments pending appeal have no res judicata effect. 
If this Court reverses the decision of the trial court in 
the personal injury action, it should make clear that the divorce 
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court's finding of fact that Mr, Noble intentionally shot his 
wife should be not be relitigated. It was fully contested in the 
divorce and specifically adjudicated. That finding was not 
appealed. Instead, the appeal urges abuse of discretion in the 
division of property and award of alimony. The finding of an 
intentional shooting is a final adjudication and it should be 
given conclusive effect in the personal injury action. 
Furthermore, this court should make it clear to the trial court 
that the doctrine of interspousal immunity is not a bar to a 
wife's action against her husband for negligently injurying her. 
This court abolished interspousal immunity in Stoker 
v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). Although Stoker itself was 
based on an intentional tortf there is no reason to limit the 
holding to its facts. The clear weight of authority on 
interspousal immunity, in Utah and other states, makes no 
distinction between negligent and intentional torts. Those few 
cases making such a distinction do not support it with persuasive 
reasoninq. The policy reasons for abolishing interspousal 
immunity are equally applicable to negligent and intentional 
torts. Stoker's abrogation of interspousal immunity should be 
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explicitly extended to neqliqent torts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL BASED UPON RES JUDICATA 
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE, FIRST, PERSONAL INJURY AND DIVORCE 
ARE NOT THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION; SECOND, THE RECORD FROM THE 
DIVORCE WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT; AND THIRD, 
A JUDGMENT ON APPEAL HAS NO RES JUDICATA EFFECT. 
A. Personal Injury and Divorce Are Not the Same Cause of 
Action. 
1, Personal Injury and Divorce are Different Causes 
of Action Because They Seek to Remedy Different 
Harms and Involve Different Issues. 
Res judicata cannot be used where the cause of action to be 
barred is different from the cause of action already 
adjudicated. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 
1978). This is true even if the two causes of action arise out 
of the same basic facts. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.2d 932, 603 
P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979). 
In Aqarwal v. Johnson, supra, plaintiff sued his former 
employer and certain individuals in Federal Court for race 
discrimination violative of the Federal Civil Riqhts Acts. In 
a separate suit, plaintiff sued the same defendants in State 
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Court for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Both suits arose out of the same facts. California's 
Supreme Court held that a judgment in the federal case was not 
res judicata as to the state claimf because the two cases were 
based upon different causes of action. In so holding, the 
California court observed as follows: 
Rut the significant factor is the harm suffered; that the 
same facts are involved in both suits is not conclusive. 
603 P.2d at 72. (Emphasis added) 
In Langley v. Schumacker, 46 Cal.2d 601, 297 P.2d 977 (Cal. 
1956), plaintiff quit her job in reliance upon defendant's 
promise to marry her. When he refused to consummate the 
marriage, she sued for its annulment. Thereafter, in a separate 
action, she sought damages for fraud. California's Supreme Court 
held res judicata did not bar the second action: 
But the fact that the same misrepresentations were involved 
in both suits is not conclusive. The harm remedied by the 
decree of annulment is not the same as the harm sought to be 
remedied by the present action. The suit for annulment was 
brought in equity to determine the plaintiff's marital 
status. In contrast, the present suit seeks damages at law 
as compensation for an injury to a property right. 
297 P.2d at 978-979. (Emphasis added) 
The facts of Langley are analogous to Mrs. Noble's 
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situation. She first sued to end her marital relationship with 
the man who had shot herf then she sued in a separate action for 
tort damages. That the same gunshot wound was involved in both 
cases is not conclusive; since each case seeks to remedy a 
different harmf res judicata cannot apply. 
In Schaer v. State By and Through the Utah Department of 
Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), the plaintiff, 
Mr. Schaer, and the Department of Transportation clashed in two 
separate lawsuits over development of the same piece of 
property. The first case was a condemnation action brought by 
the Department in 1967. In that case, Mr. Schaer convinced the 
court that a certain road was not a reasonable means of access. 
On the basis of this finding, the Department paid Mr. Schaer over 
$76,000.00 as severance damage in addition to the just compensa-
tion for the property taken. 657 P.2d at 1338-1339. 
The second lawsuit was brought by Mr. Schaer in 1979. He 
sought a declaratory judgment that the road which was not 
reasonable access in 1967 was reasonable access in 1979. The 
Department filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that res 
judicata barred relitigation of whether the road was a reasonable 
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access. 
On appeal, this Court held that res iudicata could not bar 
the 1979 case, because it was based on a different cause of 
action than the 1967 case. The court held it was a different 
cause of action because different evidence was needed to sustain 
it: 
"The two causes of action rest on a different state of facts 
and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary 
to sustain the two causes of action." 
657 P.2d at 1340. 
The message of the three cases discussed above is that two 
lawsuits are based upon different causes of action, and are 
therefore inappropriate for res judicata, if the harm sought to 
be remedied by each is different, or if evidence of a different 
kind or character is necessary to sustain each. 
Personal injury and divorce are separate causes of action, 
because they seek to remedy different harms and because evidence 
of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain each. 
Divorce seeks to remedy problems involving a marital 
relationship. In marriage, two people generally share the same 
name, home, children, and property. Separating these intertwined 
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interests is the primary function of the divorce court. Its 
purpose is to separate two people's lives in an equitable wayf 
and its goal is to enable each former spouse to embark upon a new 
life which will be happy and productive. Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 
871, 872 (Utah 1979) . 
A divorce court must consider a wide variety of factors to 
achieve an equitable division of property, includinq lenqth of 
the marriage, income at the time of divorce, mental and physical 
health, age and life expectancy, quality of the marital 
relationship, and standards of living and needs of each party. 
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah 
1951). 
In awarding alimony, the court should consider the financial 
condition and needs of the wife, the wife's income producing 
ability, and the husband's ability to provide support. English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409 ( Utah 1977). 
By contrast, a personal injury action focuses not on the 
family relationship but on a specific injury or injuries and the 
monetary damages flowing therefrom. When the plaintiff in a 
personal injury case prevails, he is entitled to the full measure 
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of his damages both past and future. These include physical pain 
and suffering, mental and emotional distress, humiliation, fear 
and anxiety, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, medical 
costs, custodial care and other expenses, loss of income and of 
earning capacity, and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages. 
See, generally, Restatement (2d) of Torts, Sections 901-910 
(1979); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983). 
In assessing tort damages, the jury fully considers the 
impact of the tort on all aspects of the plaintiff's life, but 
gives no consideration to the needs of the defendant or his 
capacity to pay. Restatement (2d) of Torts, Section 906 (1979), 
Comment a (1979). This contrasts markedly with a divorce case, 
where property division and alimony depend on the needs, income 
and future prospects of both spouses, and on the equities of each 
situation. 
Even where divorce and personal injury actions arise out of 
the same basic facts, they are not the same cause of action. 
They view the same incidents from different perspectives, employ 
different evidence, interpret the evidence according to different 
standards, and seek different objectives. For these reasons, the 
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divorce action cannot operate as res judicata to bar Mrs. Noble's 
personal injury action. 
2. The Decisions of this Court Demonstrate that 
Divorce and Personal Injury Actions Mav Arise from 
the Same Facts and Yet Not be Subjects for Res 
Judicata Effect. 
This court's instruction in Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288 
(Utah 1983), supports the conclusion that res judicata cannot be 
used to bar a tort following a divorce based on the same 
injuries. 
In Lord, plaintiff obtained a divorce from her husband and 
then later sued him for physical abuse inflicted upon her durinq 
their marriage. The trial court granted summary judgment to the 
former husband, holding that the plaintiff's claims were barred 
both by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res 
judicata. 665 P.2d at 1291. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the summary 
judgment as to the statute of limitations but expressed the 
following disapproval of the trial court's use of the doctrine of 
res judicata: 
We do not comment on this ruling other than to observe that 
actionable torts between married persons should not be 
litigated in a divorce proceeding. We believe that divorce 
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actions will become unduly complicated in their trial and 
disposition if torts can be or must be litigated in the same 
action. A divorce action is highly equitable in nature, 
whereas the trial of a tort claim is at law and may involve, 
as in this case, a request for trial by jury. The 
administration of justice will be better served by keeping 
the two proceedings separate. See Windauer v. O'Conner, 
107 Ariz. 267, 4R5 P.2d 1157 (1Q71), where the Supreme Court 
of Arizona arrived at the same conclusion because of 'the 
peculiar and special nature of a divorce action.' 
665 P.2d at 1291. (Emphasis added.) 
The language quoted above was not merely dictum. It was a 
carefully considered and relatively lenqthy instruction to the 
trial courts of this state. A careful reading of the Court's 
instruction shows that the Court was preserving, not barring, a 
separate tort action by wife against husband. 
First, the court referred to torts initiated after divorce 
as "actionable torts", indicating they are not barred by the 
divorce. 
Second, the court emphasized some of the fundamental 
differences between tort and divorce, and concluded that the two 
proceedings should be kept separate. If one of those causes of 
action could act as a bar to the other, there would be no reason 
for keeping them separate. 
Finally, if the Supreme Court had intended to bar separate 
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tort actions, it could simply have affirmed the judgment in Lord 
without comment on res judicata. By acting to separate the two 
causes of action, the Supreme Court evidenced an intent to 
preserve the tort cause of action. 
The rule in Lord was clarified and affirmed in the recent 
case of Walther v. Walther, 21 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, (November 1, 
1985). In Walther, the divorce court awarded plaintiff wife 
S5,000,00 for pain, suffering and future medical expenses. 
Although it reversed this award, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
that it is entirely proper for the wife, in a divorce action, to 
present evidence of mistreatment, suffering and injuries for the 
purpose of determining alimony. Id• 
Although the Court in Walther refused to allow the wife to 
try her tort in the same action as her divorce, it indicated that 
the tort action would be preserved: 
"The trial court should not have tried the wife's tort 
claim as part of this divorce action." 
1(3. 
This language strongly implies that the tort action could, 
and should, be tried as a separate action; not that the tort 
should be lost in the divorce and barred as a separate cause. 
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Implicit in the language of both Lord and Walther is the 
understanding, first, that evidence of mistreatment and injury 
are entirely appropriate for the purpose of awarding alimony and 
dividing property; and second, that actionable torts are not 
barred by the decisions in prior related divorces. 
Consistent with the holdings in Lord and Walther, res 
judicata should not be applied to bar Mrs. Noble's personal 
injury action. 
B. The Record in the Divorce Case was not Properly Before the 
District Court, Precluding Application of Res Judicata. 
The record on appeal does not contain the divorce decree, 
findinqs of fact, or any other documents from the divorce case. 
Nor does the record reflect that any such documents were offered 
in evidence or that the court below took judicial notice of such 
documents. The record does show that counsel for Mr. Noble, both 
in his brief and in oral argument, cited selected excerpts from 
the divorce court's findings of fact, from Mrs. Noble's appeal 
brief in the divorce case, and from comments made by the divorce 
judge at the hearing prior to adoption of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. P.I.R. at 297-299, 301-^07. 
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When the court below determined that Mrs. Noble's personal 
injury action should be barred by res judicata, it did so without 
the benefit of the record in the divorce case, relying instead 
upon portions of the record selected by Mr. Noble's counsel. 
This was improper. Res judicata must be based on the full 
record, not on portions selected by either counsel. Searle 
Bros, v. Searle, 58* P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). 
In Searle Brothers, the trial court based a finding of res 
judicata on memoranda submitted by counsel, containing references 
to the transcript of testimony in the previous divorce action. 
580 P.2d 692. The court held it was not enough to rely on 
memoranda submitted by counsel, but the court must independently 
examine the record in the prior action. Id. 
In Parrish v. Layton City Corporation, 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 
1975), this Court held as follows: 
A survey of the record reveals that the defendant never 
submitted a copy of the pleadings and judqment in Civil 
No. 17649 to the trial court, either in its pleadinqs or in 
company with its motion for summary judgment. The mere fact 
that there was a record of another action on file in the 
clerk's office did not place these records in evidence... 
since the record of the prior action was not before the 
trial court, there is no basis to sustain the determination 
that plaintiff's claim was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
542 P.2d at 1087. 
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The trial court cannot take judicial notice of records in 
another action without clearly informing counsel of its intention 
to do so and admitting into evidence the records to be judicially 
noticed. Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977); Frost 
v. Markhamf 86 N.M. 261, 522 P.2d 808 (1974). However, this 
court has independent power to take judicial notice of the record 
on appeal in the divorce case, Appeal No. 19934, even though the 
divorce record was not admitted into evidence below. City of 
Caldwell v. Roark, 98 Idaho 897, 575 P.2d 495 (1978). 
C. A Judgment on Appeal has No Res Judicata Effect. 
The judgment relied upon by the court below to bar 
Mrs. Noble's personal injury action is presently on appeal to 
this court. Appeal No. 19934. For that reason alone, res 
judicata should not have been applied. In Young v. Hansen, 11R 
Utah 1, 218 P.2d 675 (Utah 1950), this court held that a judgment 
is not final pending appeal and hence is not admissible as a bar 
to another action. 218 P.2d 675. The court in Young went on to 
state as follows: 
The rule is particularly applicable in this instance as we 
have reversed the trial court in what we shall designate as 
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the first cause. If the rule were otherwise, the plaintiff 
who succeeded in the first suit would be denied the fruits 
of that victory by a holding in a second suit that he had 
been afforded his day in court and lost. 
L3. 
The same reasoninq applies to the case at bar. If Mr. Noble 
succeeded in reversing the divorce decree on the grounds that it 
impermissibly awarded tort damagesf and at the same time res 
judicata were allowed to bar Mrs. Noble's personal injury action 
on the grounds that her damages had already been awarded in the 
divorce action, a manifest injustice would result. Since an 
appeal may reverse or materially alter the judgment sought to be 
relied uponr no judgment should be given res judicata effect 
until after the time for appeal has passed or the appeal itself 
has been decided. 
ARGUMENT 
II. 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES LITIGATION OF THE ISSUE 
OF WHETHER THE SHOOTING WAS INTENTIONAL 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the shooting were 
fully developed in the divorce case. Roth parties had ample 
motive and opoortunity to present evidence as to whether the 
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shooting was intentional. Mrs. Noble alleqed an intentional 
shooting as statutory grounds for divorce under the heading of 
cruelty giving rise to bodily injury. Mr. Noble vigorously 
contested this claim and presented evidence to support his claim 
that the shooting was unintentional and accidental. After hearinq 
the evidence, Judqe Tibbs, in the divorce case, made the follow-
ing finding of fact No. 8: 
On the late night of the 18th of August 1980, plaintiff 
intentionally and willfully, and without just cause, shot 
the defendant Elaine Hansen Noble, in the head with a .22 
calibre rifle, thereby causing severe bodily injury to the 
defendant. 
D.R. at 140. 
This finding of fact satisfies all the prerequisites for 
application of collateral estoppel: 
1. The same specific, precise issue will be litigated 
in the tort case. Schaer v. State By and Through the Utah 
Department of Transporation, 657 P.2d 337, 1341 (Utah 
1983). 
2. The issue was actually litigated and decided in the 
divorce case. Palfy v. First Bank of Valdez, 471 P.2d 379, 
384 (Alaska 1970) . 
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3. The finding was essential to the divorce decree. 
Beagles v* Seattle-First National Rank, 25 Wash.App. 925, 
610 P.2d 962, 965 (19R0). On the strength on the finding, 
the court granted the divorce to Mrs. Noble and determined 
its award of alimony and property. 
4. The divorce decree is a final judgment with respect 
to this issue. Searle Bros, v. Searle, supra, at 691. 
The divorce decree is a final judgment with respect to the 
findinq of intentional shooting because that finding has not 
been challenged on appeal. In his docketing statement in the 
divorce appeal, Mr. Noble identified two issues, both of which 
assume the correctness of the findinq of intentional shootinq: 
first, that Mrs. Noble received damages for the intentional 
shooting as part of the divorce; and second, that the divorce 
court abused its discretion in making too large a division of 
property and award of alimony to Mrs. Noble. See Appellant's 
Docketing Statement, in Appeal No. 19934. Nowhere in the 
Docketing Statement is the finding of intentional shooting 
questioned or cited as error. Id. 
Similarly, in his brief on appeal in the divorce case, 
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Mr. Noble challenged the amount of the award, not the finding of 
intentional shooting. See Appellant's Brief, in Appeal 
No. 19934. 
Since the findinq of intentional shooting has not been 
appealed, it cannot be altered or reversed on appeal. Dalton 
v. Stout, 87 Utah 39, 48 P.2d 425 (Utah 1935). Since the finding 
cannot be altered or reversed on appeal, the Young rationale does 
not apply and there is no reason not to give it final effect. 
This is particularly true where the issue was fully presented to 
and specifically adjudicated by the divorce court. 
Since the divorce decree is a final judgment as to the issue 
of intentional shooting, that issue should not be relitigated in 
the personal injury action. 
ARGUMENT 
III. 
STOKER V. STOKER ABROGATED INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY FOR 
NEGLIGENT AS WELL AS INTENTIONAL TORTS 
In her personal injury action, Mrs. Noble presented as 
alternative grounds for recovery that Mr. Noble shot her in 
the head either negligently or intentionally. P.I.R. at 88. As 
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discussed in Argument II above, the divorce court made a finding 
of fact, after hearing all the evidence, that the shooting was 
intentional, not negliqent. That finding should be given effect 
in the personal injury action, throuqh the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel• 
If the findinq of an intentional shooting is given 
collateral estoppel effect, this Court need not decide whether 
the lower court properly dismissed Mrs. Noble's cause of action 
for negligence, since that was an alternative ground for 
liability. 
However, if the court does not apply collateral estoppel to 
the finding of intentional shooting, it must determine whether 
Utah has completely abandoned interspousal immunity, or whether a 
vestige of that doctrine remains to prohibit only actions based 
upon negligence. 
A. Stoker v. Stoker Abolished Spousal Immunity Without 
Distinguishing Between Negligent and Intentional Torts. 
In Stoker v Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980), a woman 
sued her former husband for injuries he had intentionally 
inflicted prior to divorce. 616 P.2d at 590. Ouotinn from 
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Blackstone, the Utah Supreme Court first observed that inter-
spousal immunity is an ancient common law doctrine based upon the 
"legal unity" of husband and wife. The effect of "legal unity" 
was to merge a woman's identity into her husband and to suspend 
her legal existence during marriage. 616 P.2d at 590. In 1888, 
the Utah legislature put an end to "leqal unity" by enacting the 
Utah Married Women's Act. Idk at 591. The purpose of this act 
was to completely emancipate women from the disabilities imposed 
by the concept of "legal unity". Taylor v. Patteny 2 Utah 2d 
404; 275 P.2d 696, 697-69R (1954). 
As remedial legislation, in derogation of common lawf 
the Married Women's Act must be interpreted according to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 68-3-2, which provides that the statutes 
of this state "are to be liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice." 616 
P.2d at 591. 
The pertinent part of Utah's Married Women's Act provides 
that a woman "may prosecute and defend all actions for the 
preservation and protection of her rights and property as if 
unmarried." Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-4, quoted in 616 
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P.2d at 591. 
The court refused to exempt lawsuits against spouses 
from the legislature's broad grant of power to women to prosecute 
and defend all actions. Id_. In abroqating interspousal 
immunity, the court held as follows: 
"The old common law fiction is not consonant with the 
realities of today. One of the strenqths of the common 
law was its ability to change, to meet chanqe to 
conditions. Heref the legislature did not wait for the 
common law to change, it made the change for it; and 
did so at a time when a great many of Utah's sister states 
were enactingf or had previously enacted, Married Women's 
Acts. Our holding today reaffirms the legislative 
abrogation of interspousal immunity." 
616 P.2d at 592. (Emphasis added) 
The court's language is broad and purposeful. There is 
no indication of an intent to preserve interspousal immunity in 
negligence actions. Furtherf the court's interpretation of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-4 would be inconsistent if 
interpreted to preserve a narrow interspousal immunity for 
negliqence actions. As interpreted by the court in Stoker, the 
language of Section 30-2-4 gives women the riqht to prosecute all 
actions. To thereafter hold that women may sue their husbands 
for intentional torts but not for neqliqence would be 
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inconsistent with this interpretation of the governing statute. 
The district court below based its interpretation of 
Stoker upon the following sentence, which appears at the end 
of the Stoker opinion: 
"However, this does not mean that either husband or wife 
consents to intentionally inflicted serious personal 
injuries by the other." 
616 P.2d at 592. 
This sentence was part of a lengthy quote from Taylor 
v. Patten, supra, 295 P. 2d at 699, which was inserted in 
Stoker as a caveat to the general rule abroqatinq interspousal 
immunity. The caveat exempts both intentional and negligent 
harms which arise out of the intimate contacts of marriage 
in the family unit, and which are deemed consented to by both 
spouses. M[. The "intentionally inflicted personal injuries" 
which were at issue in Taylor were not exempted by the caveat, 
not because they were intentional, but because they were deemed 
outside the area of leeway which spouses are required to give 
each other. The sphere of protected activities created bv this 
caveat is clearly intended to prevent lawsuits over trivial, 
everyday, minor incidents which might be actionable between 
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strangers but should not be between spouses. Certainly, it could 
not have been intended to prevent a wife from recovering for 
injuries caused when her husband shot her in the head. 
The District Court's interpretation of Stoker is not 
supported by the Stoker opinion or its caveat, and should not be 
upheld on appeal. 
B. Utah Cases on Interspousal Immunity Prior to Stoker Provide 
No Basis for Distinguishing Between Neg]igent and 
Intentional Torts. 
Stoker's abrogation of interspousal immunity can best 
be understood in the context of the two prior Utah cases on 
interspousal immunity; Taylor v. Patten, supra; and Rubalcava 
v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344; 384 P.2d 389 (1963). In Taylor, 
this court abrogated interspousal immunity on the same grounds as 
were later readopted in Stoker: 
The Married Women's Act was intended to fully separate 
the legal identity of husband and wife, and to give each 
spouse all the legal rights of a single person. 
27S P.2d at 698. 
In Rubalcava, the court reversed itself and adopted the 
viewpoint of the dissent in Taylor; that since the Married 
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Women's Act did not specifically authorize a woman to sue 
her husband, it must be presumed that the legislature did 
not intend to abrogate spousal immunity. 384 P.2d at 393; 
see 275 P.2d at 701. 
Although the facts in Rubalcava revealed negligence rather 
than intentional tort, the court refused to distinguish Taylor on 
that basis, preferring instead to simply overrule the Taylor 
opinion. 384 P.2d at 394. 
In fact, the court in Rubalcava, pointedly observed as 
follows: 
"No basis can be found ... for any distinction between 
intentional and unintentional torts." 
384 P.2d at 392. 
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has been consistent in refusing 
to differentiate between intentional and unintentional torts, in 
cases deciding the issue of interspousal immunity. 
C. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions Reveals No Sound Basis for 
Distinguishing Between Negligent and Intentional Torts 
The majority of states abrogating interspousal immunity 
have done so without distinguishing between negligent and 
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intentional torts. 
Tn Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 376 P.2d 70 (1962), a 
wife sued her husband for negligence causinq injuries to her 
while she was walkinq on the deck of his boat. 376 P.2d at 71. 
Husband's insurance company invoked interspousal immunity as a 
defense to negligence claims. The California Supreme Court 
rejected this attempt in the following language: 
"Respondent contends that even if [interspousal immunity! is 
to be abandoned as to intentional torts, it should be 
retained as to negligent torts. It is argued that to permit 
tort actions based on negligence to be maintained between 
spouses will cause the courts to be inundated with trifling 
suits, will tend to destroy conjugal harmony, and, because 
of the possibility of insurance, will encourage collusion, 
fraud and perjury. These arguments are not convincing. 
Similar arguments were advanced in the Self case as reasons 
for maintaining the old rule as to intentional torts and 
such arguments were there found not to be convincing. They 
are not any more convincing here. It is our opinion that 
the logical and legal reasons set forth in the Self case 
that cause us to abandon the old rule as to intentional 
torts apply with equal force to negligent torts." 
376 P.2d at 72. (Emphasis added) 
The California court then noted that none of the eighteen 
states which, to that point, had abrogated or modified spousal 
immunity had drawn any distinction between intentional and 
negligent torts. Id. 
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Those few cases which abolish spousal immunity for 
intentional but not for negligent torts do not present any 
persuasive reasons for making such a distinction. For example, 
in Moser v. Hampton, 67 Or.App. 716; 679 P.2d 1379 (1983), the 
Court of Appeals of Oregon stated as follows: 
"Plaintiff invites us, by a variety of cogent arguments, to 
abolish or severely limit spousal immunity. It is not 
judicial inertia but binding precedent that compels 
rejection of the invitation. The Oregon Supreme Court has 
determined that one spouse is immune from an action by the 
other for nonintentional torts. [cites omittedl ... as in 
Winn v. Gilroy, ... we cannot disregard the controlling 
precedent." 
679 P.2d at 1381. 
The "controlling orecedent" relied upon by the Moser 
court is found in the case of Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 
287 P.2d 572 (1955). In that case, the Supreme Court of Oregon 
refused to abrogate interspousal immunitv in a situation where a 
husband was injured because of the negligent way his wife 
operated an automobile. The Oregon Supreme Court refused to 
abrogate interspousal immunity because of its interpretation of 
Oregon statutes, and then distinguished cases relied upon by the 
plaintiff on the basis that some of them were for intentional 
torts, stating as follows: 
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"In many instances alsof the cases cited by the plaintiff or 
which might be cited, have involved intentional trespasses 
as distinguished from mere negligent conduct. In the case 
of intentional wrongs, considerations of qreat potency are 
involved which are not present in cases involving negligence 
only." 
The court never explained what those "considerations of 
great potency" were. Thus, the legal distinction between 
negligent and intentional torts in Oregon is based upon 
unexplained "considerations of great potency" which are noted as 
dictum in a 1955 case. 
In Stevens v. Stevens, 647 P.2d 1346 (Kan. 1982), one 
spouse's heirs brought a wrongful death action against the 
other spouse, containing both negligence and intentional tort 
claims. The Supreme Court of Kansas decided to abrogate inter-
spousal immunity for intentional torts, but to retain it for 
nonintentional torts. The court supported its holdinq by noting 
that at least six other jurisdictions have applied the same 
rule: Arizona, California, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon and 
Texas. 647 P.2d at 1347-1348. Without providing any basis for 
distinguishing between intentional and nonintentional torts, the 
court then held as follows: 
"We are well aware of the various arguments put forth 
that the entire doctrine of interspousal immunity should be 
abrogated ... Suffice it to say, a majority of this court 
believe it is now in the best interests of the people of 
this state to retain the doctrine of interspousal immunity 
for injuries and death resulting from negligent or even 
reckless acts and to carve an exception as regards willful 
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and intentional torts." 
647 P.2d at 1348. 
Of the six states relied upon by the Kansas court in 
Stevens , at least four have subsequently overruled the cases 
cited in Stevens and have abrogated interspousal tort immunitv in 
its entirety: Fernandez v. Romoy 132 Ariz. 447, 646 P.2d 878 
(1982); Klein v. Klein, supra (Cal.); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 
242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983); and Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 
531 P.2d 947 (1975). 
In Maestas v. Overton, supra, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court held as follows: 
"Nothing would be gained by reiterating Chief Judge Woods' 
analytical condemnation of the reasons asserted as 
supporting the immunity rule in Flores, or by discussing the 
wealth of cases and scholarly commentary which have 
unmercifully attacked the underpinnings of this archaic 
concept. fcites omitted] ... 
It is our opinion that there is no logical or legal reason 
for drawing a distinction between interspousal personal 
torts intentionally inflicted and those negligently 
inflicted. See Klein v. Klein, supra. For that reason, the 
same considerations which led the Flores court to abandon 
interspousal immunity for intentional personal torts lead us 
to hold that the rule of interspousal immunity be given a 
long deserved retirement from the law of New Mexico. There 
is no immunity from tort liability between spouses by reason 
of that relationship." 
531 P.2d at 948. 
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Case law from other states thus underscores the complete 
lack of viable reasons for distinguishing between intentional and 
negligent torts with respect to the spousal immunity doctrine. 
The legal and policy grounds for continuing spousal immunity 
no longer exist. Utah's leqislature long ago expressed its 
intent that married women should retain all the rights and 
privileges they enjoyed as single persons. Stokery supra , at 
591-592. Marital harmony should not be preserved by force, and 
it certainly is not encouraged by laws which oppress one spouse 
or the other. Experience has shown that spouses who have the 
right to sue each other will not exercise that right except in 
serious situations where it is necessary to do so. Freehe 
v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183, 500 P.2d 771, 775 (1972). Utah's 
abrogation of interspousal immunity, which was announced in 
Stoker v. Stoker, should now be specifically clarified to include 
negligent torts. 
CONCLUSION 
Res judicata does not apply to bar Mrs. Noble's action for 
tort damages against her former husband, who intentionally shot 
her in the head with a .22 calibre rifle. The Order dismissing 
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Mrs. Noble's causes of action for battery and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress should be reversed and remanded 
for trial. 
On remand, the divorce court's finding that Mr, Noble 
intentionally shot his wife should not be relitiqated, but should 
be given conclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. 
This court's holding in Stoker, abrogating interspousal 
immunity should be clarified to abrogate immunity from actions 
for negligent as well as intentional injury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of January, 1986. 
It A ^ M£i\mdMMA 
AT EtfGENE tfANSEN ' 
HANSEN & QEWSNUP 
Attorneys(/:or Plainti ff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
W. EUGENE HANSEN 
HANSEN, THOMPSON & DEWSNUP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 533-0400 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
V. GLEN NOBLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELAINE HANSON NOBLE, 
Defendant. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
) LAW 
) Case No. 57-071 
The above entitled matter, having come on regularly 
for trial before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge of the 
above-entitled court, on December 22 and 23, 198 3, and January 
23, 1984. It appearing from the files and records herein that 
the complaint has been on file for more than ninety (90) days, 
and the plaintiff being present in court and being represented 
by his attorneys, H. Grant Ivins, and Dallas H. Young, Jr., and 
the defendant being present in court and represented by her 
attorney, W. Eugene Hansen, and the parties having presented 
their evidence and have rested and having argued the matter to 
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the court, and having submitted the matter to the court for 
determination, and the court being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are bona fide and actual 
residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and were for more than 
three months immediately prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having 
been married on July 23, 1977. 
3. No children have been born as issue of the marriage. 
4. Since August 18, 1980, plaintiff and defendant have 
not lived together as husband and wife. 
5. Good cause exists by reason of the facts of this 
case and the time that has elapsed from the filing of the 
complaint to the entry of the decree herein to waive the 
interlocutory period and to make the decree final upon entry. 
6. Plaintiff is not entitled to prevail on his 
complaint for divorce. 
7. During the period of time immediately prior to the 
18th of August 1980, plaintiff used intoxicants in excess, and 
was frequently intoxicated and was abusive and embarrassed 
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defendant, all of which constituted cruel treatment and caused 
defendant to suffer great mental distress. 
8. On the late night of the 18th of August 1980, 
plaintiff intentionally and willfully and without just cause, 
shot the defendant Elaine Hansen Noble, in the head with a .22 
caliber rifle, thereby causing severe bodily injury to the 
defendant. 
9. As a result of the aforesaid intentional, willful 
and wrongful acts of the plaintiff, the defendant has suffered 
permanent injuries which have resulted in her being rendered 
unemployable and have further resulted in a condition such that 
defendant cannot live alone and she can no longer use a motor 
vehicle safely, and she is totally and permanently disabled. 
10. From the date of the marriage of the parties on July 
23, 1977, until August 19, 1980, said parties resided in a home 
at 420 North 600 West in Pleasant Grove, Utah, which defendant 
owned a one-half interest in. 
11. Defendant has borrowed money from her family members 
to sustain her during the pendency of this action and owes the 
sum of $38,544.00 to them for this purpose. 
12. Plaintiff is 65 years of age and has applied for 
social security benefits and has ceased the active management 
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and operation of a trucking business but will have income from 
social security and land contracts and interest income in excess 
of $2,000.00 per month. 
13. Defendant has income in the form of social security 
disability benefits on the sum of $307.00 per month. 
14. Plaintiff has a life expectancy of 13.7 years; 
defendant has a life expectancy of 38.5 years. 
15. Defendant is in need of and plaintiff has ability to 
pay the sum of $750.00 per month as alimony, commencing on the 
1st day of February 1984, and due and payable thereafter on the 
first day of each and every month. Said sum should be paid to 
the clerk of the court of Utah County for and in behalf of 
defendant. 
16. Defendant has an asset consisting of an interest in 
a home at 420 North 600 West in Pleasant Grove, Utah, with an 
equity value of approximately $26,000.00, which property should 
be awarded to defendant. 
17. Plaintiff has assets of a fair market value in 
excess of $800,000.00. The net equity of plaintiff in major 





Villa Maria Apartments and Ajax Investors 
Properties at 443 South State Street, 
Provo, Utah—a 1/3 interest 
a. Home with 1 acre of land and garage 
at 1225 North 600 West, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah 
b. 7.72 acres of land at approximately 
1225 North 600 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah 
c. Office and Shops located at 
approximately 1225 North 600 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 
14.32 Acres of land at approximately 
8300 North 4250 West, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah 
(4) 1984 El Dorado Cadillac 







(See Note 1) 
$23,000.00 
$20,000.00 
NOTE 1: Land has a fair market value of $115,000.00 with bank 






( 1 0 ) 
( 1 1 ) 
( 1 2 ) 
( 1 3 ) 
( 1 4 ) 
( 1 5 ) 
( 1 6 ) 
( 1 7 ) 
( 1 8 ) 










1971 Timpte Trailer # 24 
1973 Timpte Trailer # 25 
1973 Timpte Trailer # 26 
1973 Timpte Trailer # 27 
Alpine Country Club Membership 
Cash in Bank of American Fork 
Real Estate Contracts 
Note Receivable 
Pickup Truck 
1969 Balboa 18f Boat 
Airstream Trailer 
Miscellaneous Livestock 
Douglas Turner Land Contract 1982 
Undivided 1/2 interest in and to 
the summer home located in American 
Fork Canyon, Utah County, Utah 
18. By reason of the unusual circumstances of this 
case, a just and equitable distribution of the above properties 
of the parties held during the marriage requires that a division 
be made as follows: 
TO DEFENDANT: 
(1) One half of the parties1 interest 
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in the Villa Maria Apartments and 
Ajax Investors Properties 
located at 443 South State Street, 
Provo, Utah. 
(2) An undivided 1/2 interest in the 
14.32 acres of land at approximately 8300 
North 4200 West, Pleasant Grovef Utah, 
subject to 1/2 of the outstanding 
debt in favor of the Bank of American 
Fork against the said property which 
defendant should be ordered to assume 
and pay. 
(3) $10f000.00 of the cash in the Bank 
of American Fork. 
(4) An undivided 1/2 interest in the summer 
home of the parties located in American 
Fork Canyon, Utah County, Utah. 
TO THE PLAINTIFF: 
(1) 1/2 of the parties' interest in the 
Villa Maria Apartments and Ajax 
Investors properties located at 443 
South State Street, Provo, Utah. 
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(2) a. The home with 1 acre of ground and 
garage at 1225 North 600 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
b. 7.72 acres of land at 1225 North 
600 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah 
c. The office and shops at 
1225 North 600 West, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah. 
(3) An undivided 1/2 interest in and to 
the 14.32 acres of land at approximately 
8300 North 4250 Westf Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, subject to 1/2 of the indebtedness 
in favor of the Bank of American Fork 
which plaintiff should be ordered to assume 
and pay. 
(4) The 1984 El Dorado Cadillac 
(5) 1971 Timpte Trailer #24 
(6) 1973 Timpte Trailer #25 
(7) 1973 Timpte Trailer #26 
(8) 1973 Timpte Trailer #27 
(9) Alpine Country Club Membership 
(10) Cash in Bank of American Fork less 
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$10,000.00. 
(11) The following real estate contracts: 
Peter Lawrence Contract 
Steven Brandt Contract 
Douglas Turner Contract 
(12) 1969 Balboa 18' Boat 
(13) Airstream Trailer 
(14) Miscellaneous Livestock 
(15) Douglas Turner Land Contract 
1982 
(16) Undivided 1/2 interest in and to 
the summer home located in American 
Fork canyon, Utah County, Utah. 
19. The 1978 Kenworth Tractor should be sold by counsel 
for the parties to recover the best price obtainable. Such sale 
should take place no later than August lf 1984. From the sale 
of the said Kenworth Tractor, the sum of $10,000.00 should be 
delivered to defendant's attorney to apply to his attorney's 
fees, which the court finds should be awarded to defendant's 
counsel. The balance should be delivered to defendant to be 
used to help offset moneys advanced to her by her said family 
during the pendency of this action. 
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20. With respect to the summer home of the parties, it 
should be ordered to be sold by February 1, 1985, and each party 
receive one half of the said proceeds. 
21. The court finds that the properties listed on the 
addendum to the schedule of assets which is a part of Exhibit 17 
to wit: The 1979 Balboa 18' boat, the airstream trailer, 
livestock, Douglas Turner land contract, and the summer home all 
have value. The court has taken this into consideration in 
determining the amount of alimony awarded herein. 
22. The following property located at defendant's 
residence at 420 North 600 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, is 
claimed by plaintiff and defendant: 
a. The Whirlpool Refrigerator 
24 cubic foot 
b. The king sized bedroom set 
c. The valet set, special design with 
drawers, built-in hangers, mirror 
and shoe space 
d. The large rocking chair, Abraham Lincoln 
style 
23. It would be reasonable to award defendant the 
whirlpool refrigerator, 24 cubic foot, and the king sized 
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bedroom set and to award the plaintiff the valet set, special 
design with drawers, built-in hangers, mirror and shoe space, 
and the large rocking chairf Abraham Lincoln style. 
24. In addition to the above properties, the parties 
each have miscellaneous items of personal property, clothing and 
effects which should be awarded to the individual party who has 
possession of the same. 
25. It would be reasonable to award the parties all of 
the assets which each had prior to their entering into the 
marriage except as hereinabove set forth. 
26. During the pendency of the action, defendant has 
received $9,500.00 from the plaintiff as temporary support. 
27. Since August 19, 1980, plaintiff has received the 
following sums from the sources indicated in addition to moneys 
he has received from other sources: 
DATE RECEIVED AMOUNT RECEIVED 
Crockett Property Sale 12 December 1980 $ 32,450.01 
Webb Property Sale 6 July 1981 $ 50,000.00 
1 September 1981 $164,690.68 
9 November 1981 $205,187.57 
10 December 1981 $355,092.00 
TOTAL $452,684.18 
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Money received by plaintiff from sale of stock in 
Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove: 
DATE OF RECEIPT AMOUNT RECEIVED 
12 March 1981 $ 33,333.00 
September 1981 $ 4f234.45 
December 1981 $ 2f117.23 
10 March 1982 $ 37,477.46 
March 1983 $ 39,630.64 
TOTAL $116,792.78 
28. There is a civil action for tort presently pending 
in the District Court of Utah County wherein Elaine Hansen Noble 
appears as plaintiff and V. Glen Noble appears as defendant, 
Civil No. 60,185. The court has not considered that action in 
making its decision herein. 
29. Defendant was required to obtain the services of an 
attorney to defend as against plaintiff's action and to 
prosecute her action against defendant and should be awarded a 
reasonable attorneyfs fee in the sum of $10,000.00 which 
plaintiff should be ordered to pay. 
30. It would be reasonable for each party to pay his or 
her own debts and obligations incurred during the marriage 
-12-
except for the obligation to the Bank of American Fork 
specifically referred to in the Findings which defendant should 
be ordered to assume and pay one-half of. 
31. The parties should be ordered to execute such 
documents as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the 
decree to be entered herein. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court concludes 
as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff's complaint for divorce should be 
dismissed, no cause of action. 
2. Defendant is entitled to a decree of divorce. Said 
decree to become final upon entry. 
3. The said decree should incorporate the provisions of 
the Findings hereinabove set forth with respect to alimony, 
property-distribution and obligations of the parties. 
DATED^ feh-fSv. T J day ~oF^fe^try, 1984. 
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law to the office of H. Grant Ivins, this \Q day 
of February, 1984. 
QL** \. \\ O*M/K 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE HANSEN NOBLE, Civil No. 60105" 
Plaintiff, 
vs. D E C I S I O N 
V. GLENN NOBLE, 
Defendant. 
This matter having been submitted pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the 
Rules of Practice, and the Court having entered a tentative Ruling on 
January 27, 1983 indicating its inclination to grant the defendant's 
Motion and granted oral argument as requested by plaintiff on the 10th 
day of February, 1983, at which time the Court took the matter under 
advisement and granted counsel for plaintiff leave to make available to 
the Court the transcript of criminal proceedings against defendant for 
the incident which plaintiff seeks relief in this proceeding. 
The Court notes that in its Ruling of January 27th no distinction 
was made between the intentional and negligently inflicted injury since 
the motion of defendant only went to the claim for negligently caused 
injury. 
While the Court had under consideration the motion of defendant 
as above-indicated, an Amended Complaint was filed which set forth 
claims for intentional and negligently inflicted injury to plaintiff by 
the defendant* At the time of oral argument that was noted by the Court 
and the parties presented arguments as to both types of claims. The 
Court now having fully considered all of the argument and memorandum of 
law and having reviewed pertinent portions of the transcript of the 
criminal proceeding, now enters the following: 
RULING 
The Court Rules in this matter that the laws of the State of 
Utah do not authorize the bringing of a claim by one spouse against 
the other for negligently caused injury. Although the line of authori-
ties in this area beginning with Taylor v. Patton, which held that a 
wife could sue her husband for an intentionally inflicted injury during 
the marriage, the case of Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 U. 2d 344, 384 
P. 2d 389 (1963), overruled Taylor v. Patton holding that the statutes 
of this state did not confer any authority for the wife to sue her 
husband in tort. However, in the case of Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P. 2d 
590 (Utah, 1980) , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Taylor decision, 
calling attention to the caveat at page 408 of the Utah Report in 
Taylor v. Patton pointing out that inherant in the marital relation-
ship is mutual consent to physical contact with each other. Con-
cluding it with the following: 
"However, this does not mean that either husband 
or wife consents to intentionally inflicted serious 
personal injuries by the other." 
The holding in Stoker v. Stoker is to the effect that "Under our 
statutes a wife may recover from her husband for intentionally inflicted 
injuries." 
From the foregoing it appears that spousal immunity still exists 
in Utah for negligently inflicted injury. The Court therefore grants the 
motion of the defendant for Judgment on the pleadings as to the Amended 
Complaint/ Count I, but denies the motion for Judgment on the pleadings 
or for Summary Judgment as to Count II. 
Counsel for the defendant is directed to prepare an Order imple-
menting the foregoing Ruling of the Court. 
Dated at Provo/ Utah County, Utah, this 7 day of April, 1983. 
r^  ^ GEORGE E^ T BALL 
JACKSON HOWARD, for: 
ep-
ELAINE HANSEN NOBLE, 
Plaintiff, ORDER 
vs, 
V. GLEN NOBLEf Civil No. 60f185 
Defendant. : 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
I n 120 EAST 300 NORTH STREET 
II P. O. BOX 7 7 8 
PROVO. UTAH 84603 
p ll TELEPHONE 373 -6345 
3 || Attorneys for Defendant 
4 
5 I  IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 







13 || The defendant's motion for summary judgment having come on 
14 regularly Eor hearing on the 30th day of November, 1984, the plain-
15* tiff having appeared by and through her counsel, W. Eugene Hansen, 
16 and the defendant having appeared by and through his counsel, 
17 Jackson Howard, and the Court having before it the pleadings of the 
18 parties and legal memorandums and being fully advised in the 
19 premises, 
20 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of the defendant is 
21 granted and the plaintiff's case is dismissed on the basis that the 
22 issues presented in the plaintiff's complaint are proscribed by the 
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DATED this / *f day of December, 1984. 




^ • ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing ORDER to W. Eugene Hansen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 2020 Beneficial Life Tower, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this //Va£ day of December, 1984. 
±L£-
SECRETARY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of January 1986, four 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief were 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, to Jackson B. Howard, 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent, at 120 East 300 North, Provo, 
Utah 84603. 
